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OWN YOUR MARK: TRADEMARK LAW AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION 
 
Part I.  Introduction 
Oprah Winfrey’s couch has had many iconic moments, after all who could forget Tom 
Cruise ecstatically jumping up and down declaring his love for Katie Holmes.  Unfortunately, for 
Oprah, it may be trademark owners turn to jump for joy at her expense thanks to a recent Second 
Circuit decision.  The Second Circuit expressly disavowed a standard proposed by the Sixth 
Circuit, which stated that an alleged infringer must use a trademark as a trademark in order for a 
plaintiff to bring an infringement action.
1
  As a result, the Sixth Circuit broadened a narrow 
exception to non-infringing use of a mark that could result in serious injury to trademark owners.  
The Second Circuit correctly emphasized likelihood of consumer confusion as the proper test 
and not whether the alleged infringer had used the mark as a trademark.
2
 
It is a considerable challenge to claim that Oprah is not a major celebrity and media giant 
today.  Oprah’s brand, which is her name, is internationally recognizable.  Oprah is probably one 
of the most recognized and respected celebrities.  She has created a media empire around her 
name and recently launched her own network.  Around this empire, Oprah has established a 
family of trademarks and brands.  The strength, reputation, and recognition of Oprah’s brands, 
though, do not give Oprah carte blanche to promote her brands at the expense of smaller 
trademark owners.  Recently, Oprah’s company arranged to buy the rights to the trademark of 
“OWN ONYX WOMAN NETWORK” in order to avoid any infringement action with the 
                                                 
1
 See Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295 (2d Cir. 2013); Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride Inc., 579 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 
2009). 
2
 See Kelly-Brown, 717 F.3d 295. 
previous owner of the mark.
3
  Oprah and her affiliates wanted the mark “OWN” for Oprah’s 
emerging cable channel.  The only problem is that Oprah’s ensuing use of the “OWN” mark was 
eerily similar to one other trademark.  Simone Kelly-Brown is a motivational speaker who 
cultivated a brand around the mark “Own Your Power.”4  Oprah’s company would have 
discovered this information when it was acquiring the rights to OWN ONYX WOMAN 
NETWORK.
5
  Oprah then launched a promotional event in conjunction with her new media 
empire by hosting an event around the theme “Own Your Power”.6  The Second Circuit held that 
although Oprah and her affiliates may not have used “Own Your Power” as a trademark there 
was still a real possibility that consumers were likely to be confused.
7
  In holding so, the Second 
Circuit directly attacked the standard promulgated by the Sixth Circuit that required use as a 
trademark as a threshold matter for an infringement action.
8
   
A trademark is “any word, name, symbol, or device . . . used by a person . . . to identify 
and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold to 
others and to indicate source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.”9  The basic function 
of trademarks is to serve as source-identifiers.
10
  Trademark law attempts to protect both the 
consumer and the owner of the mark from unfair competition that results when another 
appropriates the mark for his own benefit.
11
  The danger is that infringing users can free ride on 
the owner of the mark’s goodwill and reputation by inducing the consumer to believe that the 
                                                 
3
 Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295, 299–300 (2d Cir. 2013). 
4
 Id. at 299. 
5
 Id. at 299–300.  
6
 Kelly-Brown, 717 F.3d at 301. 
7
 Id. at 307. 
8
 Id. at 305–307.  
9
 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
10
 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 514 US 159, 163–164 (1995).  
11
 See Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 973–974 (2d Cir. 1928). 
goods originate from the same source.
12
  In order to bring an infringement action, a plaintiff must 
prove he owns the mark; the mark was used in commerce, and use of the mark likely caused 
consumer confusion.
13
  The main claim in an infringement action is likelihood of confusion.  
Likelihood of confusion exists when “an appreciable number of ordinary prudent purchasers are 
likely to be misled, or indeed simply confused, as to the source of the goods in question.”14 
The Sixth Circuit in Hensley advocated that there could never be likelihood of confusion 
when trademarks are not used in a trademark way.
15
  The court based its decision off an earlier 
case that held that trademarks in the post-domain path do not signify source and thus the eight-
factor likelihood of confusion analysis is not applicable.
16
  The rationale was that the purpose of 
trademarks is to signify source and that using a mark in the post-domain path of a website does 
not signify source to the consumer.  Since the mark is not being used in such a “trademark way” 
the court found that the likelihood of consumer confusion was highly unlikely and declined to 
apply the eight-factor test.
17
  The Sixth Circuit founded this rationale off a case out of the Ninth 
Circuit, which propounded the concept of nominative fair use as a non-infringement use.
18
  The 
Second Circuit disagreed with this standard because it presupposes consumer confusion, or lack 
thereof, without even addressing the traditional eight-factor, fact intensive inquiry.
19
  The Second 
Circuit observed that the standard proffered by the Sixth Circuit could potentially prevent 
legitimate infringement claims from reaching the likelihood of confusion analysis.
20
  Should the 
courts follow the Sixth Circuit and decide, as a threshold matter, whether the alleged 
                                                 
12
 Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 973–974 (2d Cir. 1928). 
13
 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1). 
14
 Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978). 
15
 Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 610 (6th Cir. 2009). 
16
 Interactive Prods. Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 698 (6th Cir. 2003). 
17
 See id.  
18
 See New Kids on the Block v. News America Pub. Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307–308 (9th Cir. 1991) 
19
 See Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey 717 F.3d 295, 307 (2d Cir. 2013).  
20
 Id. 
infringement uses the mark in a trademark way or is the Second Circuit correct in disregarding 
this requirement as overly restrictive? 
This Note will argue that the Second Circuit is correct in dismissing the Sixth Circuit’s 
standard.  Part II of this Note will outline the applicable background trademark law and policy.  
Part III will focus on the cases that led to the Second and Sixth Circuit split.  Part IV will discuss 
how these cases apply to the relevant trademark law and the possible consequences.   
Part II.  Background Trademark Law 
The History and Basics of Trademark Law 
 A trademark is “any word, name, symbol, or device . . . used by a person . . . to identify 
and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by 
others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.”21 A service mark 
is “a mark used in the sale or advertising of services to identify the services of one person and 
distinguish them from the services of others.”22  Since both are extremely similar, they are often 
commonly labeled as trademarks.
23
  Trademarks serve several functions, including; signifying 
source, to signify the same source controls the trademarked goods; to signify a consistent level of 
quality with the goods bearing the trademark; and as an advertisement tool.
24
  Additionally, 
trademarks serve as “an objective symbol of the good will the business has built up.25 
 Trademark law thus strives to strike a balance between protecting the consuming public 
from deception and protecting property that a person has put considerable time, effort, and 
resources into developing, with encouraging competition.
26
  The American concept of the free 
                                                 
21
 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
22
 Id. 
23
 J. McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 3.1(4th ed. 2013). 
24
 Id. at § 3.2. 
25
 Id. 
26
 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
market focuses on the theory that competition, uninhibited, “is both socially and economically 
desirable” because it keeps prices down for consumers while still allowing business owners to 
turn a profit.
27
  Within this system, the well-known adage “imitation is the greatest form of 
flattery” took shape.  Businesses’ strategies, ideas, and other aspects, once placed in the public 
domain, become open to imitation.
28
  Intellectual property, including trademarks, is one of the 
specifically identified exceptions to this thought.
29
 
 Therefore, on one side is the basic tenet that free competition serves substantial social 
and economic interests and should be unfettered.  On the other side, trademark law seeks to 
protect both the public and trademark owners from conduct that goes beyond imitation and 
approaches deception.
30
  A competitor, who attempts to copy a mark, injures the trademark 
owner because he is, in essence, standing in as the owner and is speaking for him without the 
owner’s consent.31  It does not matter if there is no economic injury to the trademark owner or 
even if the competitor has enhanced the owner’s reputation, the injury occurs immediately when 
the competitor appropriates the mark and, by doing so, holds himself out as the owner.
32
  
Additionally, the consuming public is harmed when there are multiple, similar marks.  The 
consumer’s search costs, the time it takes him to make a decision, will rise as he must spends 
time differentiating between the competing marks and deciding which one stands for the quality 
                                                 
27
 McCarty on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 1.1. 
28
 Id. at § 1.2. 
29
 Id. 
30
 “This area of the law is generally referred to as ‘unfair competition’ – unfair because, by using a rival’s mark, the 
infringer capitalizes on the investment of time, money and resources of his competitor, unfair also because, by doing 
so, he obtains the consumer’s hard-earned dollar through something akin to fraud.” New Kids on the Block v. News 
America Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305 (9th Cir. 1992). 
31
 “If another uses [the trademark], he borrows the owner’s reputation, whose quality no longer lies within his own 
control . . . for a reputation, like a face, is the symbol of its possessor and creator, and another can use it only as a 
mask.” Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson 26 F.2d 972, 973–974 (2d. Cir. 1928). 
32
 See id. 
and product he desires.
33
  Therefore, trademark laws serve an important function within the free 
market society because they prevent consumer confusion as well as allow the owner to control 
his products and reputation.
34
 
Use as a Trademark 
 Use as a trademark can be a tricky question since there are multiple meanings to “use as a 
trademark,” for instance, “use in commerce” and “use of a mark” both qualify as “trademark 
use.”35  Use in commerce is a requirement for trademark protection.  After all, how can 
something serve as a source-identifier to the consuming public if there is nothing for the public 
to consume?
36
  “The term ‘use in commerce’ means the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary 
course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in the mark.”37  Trademark plaintiffs do 
not need to prove the “use in commerce” requirement; rather, it is fulfilled whenever a mark is 
fixed to goods “in any manner.”38  Token use does not count as “use in commerce.”39  Courts 
have found use of a trademark on internet search engines to trigger a competitor’s mark or copy 
satisfied the “use in commerce” requirement.40  Slogans have presented a particular difficult 
problem for courts in determining whether the slogans are trademarks.  “Courts have protected 
advertising slogans under the theory that companies have devoted a great deal of time and 
                                                 
33
 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–164 (1995). 
34
 See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205 (2d. Cir. 1979). 
35
 “Defendants conflate two distinct concepts, use of a trademark in commerce and use as a mark, both of which, 
confusingly, we describe by the shorthand phrase ‘trademark use.’” Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295, 305 (2d 
Cir. 2013). 
36
 See McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 3.3. 
37
 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
38
 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
39
 See Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Inc., 485 F. Supp 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (finding Proctor and 
Gamble’s attempts to preserve rights in mark by attaching it to other products and sending out small, scheduled, 
shipments was token use); Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 508 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding Blue Bell did 
not meet the “use in commerce” requirement by attaching the new mark to other blue jeans that already bore an 
established mark). 
40
 See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 125–126 (2d Cir. 2009) . 
expense into creating an association in the minds of consumers between a slogan and a particular 
product.”41  Courts have also determined that slogans did not give rise to trademark protection.42   
While “use in commerce” gives rise to trademark protection, trademark owners may still 
have recourse if others are using their mark.  This “use as mark” is not as clear as the “use in 
commerce” requirement.  “The critical enquiry in determining whether a designation functions as 
a mark is how the designation would be perceived by the relevant public.”43  For the most part, 
whether a designation is used as a mark is readily apparent and should not involve focused legal 
examination.
44
  The dispositive question of whether the designation is a mark is whether the user 
attempted to draw attention to the designation.
45
  The Second Circuit has stated that when 
determining whether the trademark has been used as a mark, the critical inquiry is how the mark 
was used.
46
 
A subset of “use as a mark” that has particularly vexed courts is whether use of a 
personal name can give rise to an infringement action.
47
  In Madrigal, the court held that “when 
an individual sells no more than the right to use his name as a trade name or trademark,” he is 
not prohibited “from taking advantage of his individual reputation by establishing a company 
which competes against the purchaser of the trade name,” or “from advertising, in a not overly 
intrusive manner, that he is affiliated with a new company.”48  It follows then, that although a 
person establishes a trademark in his own name and is allowed to transfer ownership of that 
                                                 
41
 Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295, 309 (2d Cir. 2013); See, e.g., Nike, Inc. v. “Just Did It” Enters., 6 F.3d 
1225 (7th Cir. 1993); Cont’l Scale Corp. v. Weight Watchers Int’l, Inc., 517 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1975); Chem. 
Corp. of Am. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1962). 
42
 See, e.g., In re International Paper Company, 142 U.S.P.Q. 503, 1964 WL 8038 (T.T.A.B. 1964); In re Illinois 
Bronze Powder & Paint Co., 188 U.S.P.Q. 459, 1975 WL 20850 (T.T.A.B. 1975); In re European-American Bank & 
Trust Company, 201 U.S.P.Q. 788, 1979 WL 24821 (T.T.A.B. 1979). 
43
 In re Eagle Crest, Inc., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d 1227, 1229, 2010 WL 3441109 (T.T.AB. 2010). 
44
 See McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 3.3. 
45
 See JA Apparel Corp. v. Abboud, 568 F.3d 390, 400 (2d Cir. 2009). 
46
 “In determining whether a use is made as a mark, however, we make a more detailed determination of the 
particular manner in which the mark was used.”  Kelly-Brown, 717 F.3d at 306 (internal citations omitted). 
47
 See Madrigal Audio Laboratories v. Cello, Ltd., 799 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1986). 
48
 Id. at 823. 
mark, he is not prevented from capitalizing on his own reputation so long as he comports himself 
in the proper way.
49
 
Even if an alleged infringer uses a trademark, the infringer can utilize several defenses.  
For instance, an infringer can allege that the use is not likely to cause consumer confusion 
because the infringer is using the mark in a non-trademark way and it is not a source-identifier.
50
  
Additionally, if the alleged infringer used the mark in its original descriptive sense then the 
infringer could raise a fair use defense.
51
  This nominative fair use defense applies to cases where 
there is no “attempt to capitalize on consumer confusion or to appropriate the cachet of one 
product for a different use.”52  This occurs when “the only word reasonably available to describe 
a particular thing is pressed into service.”53  The alleged infringer is not attempting to deceive the 
public because he is not using the mark to signify his own goods but is, instead, truthfully 
describing the original owner’s product.54  The existence of direct competition does not turn 
nominative fair use into an infringement action.
55
  In New Kids on the Block, several news 
outlets set up hotlines and charged customers to call and answer poll questions about the music 
group.
56
  The nominative fair use defense requires the alleged infringer to prove three things: (1) 
the product is not “readily identifiable without the use of the trademark”; (2) “only so much of 
                                                 
49
 See Madrigal Audio Laboratories v. Cello, Ltd., 799 F.2d 814, 823 (2d Cir. 1986); Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 
579 F.3d 603, 610 (6th Cir. 2009). 
50
 See Interactive Prods. Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 698 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting the 
existence of the trademark in the post-domain path was not a source-identifier and was not likely to cause consumer 
confusion). 
51
 See Packman v. Chicago Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding the Chicago Tribune used the mark 
“The Joy of Six” to describe the Chicago Bulls sixth championship and did not infringe); New Kids on the Block v. 
News America Pub., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting there was no feasible way to refer to music group other 
than as their name) 
52
 New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308. 
53
 Id. 
54
 “When the mark is used in a way that does not deceive the public we see no such sanctity in the word as to 
prevent its being used to tell the truth.” Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924). 
55
 New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 309. 
56
 Id. at 309–310. 
the mark . . . may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product”; and (3) the alleged 
infringer must do nothing that suggests sponsorship or affiliation by the trademark owner.
57
   
The concept of fair use expanded with the rise in technology.  Courts have addressed 
when the use of trademarks can rise to the level of infringement with regard to the internet.  
Courts have stated “a website’s domain name signifies its source of origin.”58  “Words in domain 
names can and do communicate information as to the source or sponsor of a website.”59  But 
“when a domain name is used only to indicate an address on the Internet and not to identify the 
source of the specific goods and services, the name is not functioning as a trademark.”60 
Additionally, the post-domain path does not signify origin but instead, “serves a different 
function.”61  The court in Interactive Products noted that consumers looking for a specific 
product were not likely to be confused by the existence of the mark in the post-domain path of 
defendant’s website because that is not how a prospective purchaser would search for the product 
in question.
62
 
Therefore, use as a trademark does not give rise to an infringement action when the 
designation is used solely in its descriptive sense,
63
 there is no other reasonable way to describe 
the product or service, the mark is being used to designate plaintiff’s goods or services and not 
defendants,
64
  and the mark is not being used as a source-identifier on the internet.
65
   
                                                 
57
 New Kids on the Block v. News America Pub., 971 F.2d 302, 309 (9th Cir. 1991).  
58
 Patmont Motor Werks v. Gateway Marine, Inc., No. C96-2703, 1997 U.S. Dis. LEXIS 208877, *4 (N.D. Cal. 
Dec.18 1997). 
59
 PACCAR, Inc. v. Telescan Tech, 319 F.3d 243, 250 (6th Cir. 2003). 
60
 Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620, 62 –628 (6th Cir. 1998). 
61
 Id. 
62
 See Interactive Prods Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 697 (6th Cir. 2003) (observing 
consumers were not likely to enter “a2zsolutions.com/desk/floor/laptraveler/dkfl-lt.htm” instead of 
“Laptraveler.com” when searching for plaintiff’s Laptraveler product). 
63
 See Packman v. Chicago Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628 (7th Cir. 2001).  
64
 See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d 302. 
65
 See Interactive Prods Corp., 326 F.3d 687. 
The use of a mark in the secondary market also does not rise to the level of 
infringement.
66
  In Champion Spark Plug, the defendant repaired used “CHAMPION” spark 
plugs and resold them with each individual plug stamped with the word “reused.”67  The court 
noted that despite the restoration, the spark plugs remained the product of the plaintiff.
68
  The 
court likened this situation to the selling of a used car and how it would be tedious to require a 
secondary seller to remove the manufacturer’s designation solely because he had repaired some 
aspect of the car.
69
  “Inferiority is immaterial so long as the article is clearly and distinctly sold 
as repaired or recondition rather than as new.”70  The court noted “the second-hand dealer gets 
some advantage from the trademark . . . that is wholly permissible so long as the manufacturer is 
not identified with the inferior qualities of the product resulting from wear and tear or the 
reconditioning by the dealer.”71 
Likelihood of Confusion 
 The likelihood of consumer confusion and not actual consumer confusion is essential in a 
trademark infringement action.
72
  A requirement of actual confusion would frustrate trademark 
owners from protecting their marks when an infringing product is new on the market.
73
  Courts 
look to whether there is a likelihood of confusion when examining whether or not there is an 
infringing use of a trademark.
74
  Likelihood of confusion occurs when a significant number of 
prudent consumers are likely to be misled or confused “as to the source of the goods in 
                                                 
66
 See Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (1947). 
67
 Id. at 126. 
68
 Id. 
69
 See id. 
70
 Id. at 130. 
71
 Id. 
72
 Likelihood of confusion results in injunctive relief but if a plaintiff seeks monetary damages then actual confusion 
must be proved.  See McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 23.12. 
73
 See id. 
74
 Id. at § 23.1. 
question.”75  “The ultimate question remains whether relevant consumers are likely to believe 
that the products or services offered by the parties are affiliated in some way.”76  There are eight 
factors that courts consider in determining likelihood of confusion: (1) the strength of the mark; 
(2) degree of similarity between the marks; (3) the proximity of the products; (4) the likelihood 
the senior user will bridge the gap; (5) actual consumer confusion; (6) the junior user’s intent; (7) 
the quality of the junior user’s product; and (8) the sophistication of the buyers.77  Nearly every 
circuit has this fact-intensive, eight-factor test, widely known as the Polaroid factors.
78
  None of 
the Polaroid factors is expressly dispositive; instead, the analysis looks at the factors in their 
totality.
79
  It should be noted that while no singular factor is dispositive, courts have sometimes 
found that intentional copying or bad faith in adopting a mark creates a presumption of actual 
confusion.
80
  There is a circuit split of authority among the circuits as to whether likelihood of 
confusion is an issue of law or an issue of fact.
81
  Most circuits view likelihood of confusion as 
an issue of fact reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.
82
  The Second and Sixth Circuits 
take the stance that likelihood of confusion is a mixed question of fact and law; the factual 
findings of the eight-factor test are questions of fact while the balancing of those factors is a 
question of law.
83
 
 There are several types of confusion including initial interest confusion (or pre-sale 
confusion), post-sale confusion, confusion as to affiliation, and reverse confusion.  Initial interest 
                                                 
75
 Light Sources, iNc. v. Cosmedico Light, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 2d 432 (D. Conn. 2005). 
76
 Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1107 (6th Cir. 1991). 
77
 Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961); see also AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft 
Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979); Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460 (3d Cir. 1983). 
78
 See Polaroid Corp., 287 F.2d at 495. 
79
 Star Indus v. Bacardi & Co., 412 F.3d 373, 384 (2d Cir. 2005). 
80
 “Intentional copying gives rise to a presumption of a likelihood of confusion.” Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus 
Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Perfect Fit Industries v. Acme Quilting Co., 618 F.2d 
950, 954 (2d Cir. 1980). 
81
 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 23.67. 
82
 Id. 
83
 See Id. 
confusion occurs when a prospective customer, at first glance, believes there is some connection 
between the product and the original mark owner.
84
  Thus in Steinway & Sons, the court 
observed that a customer searching to buy a piano might think of the quality and reputation of a 
Steinway piano upon hearing the name “Grotrian-Steinweg” and believe the pianos are somehow 
connected.
85
  The competing marks do not have to look or sound similar as long as the consumer 
would initially believe there is some kind of affiliation.
86
  In Mobil Oil, the defendant company 
made wholesale oil deals, mostly by phone.  The court found that the defendant could gain 
credibility “during the initial phases of a deal” because its use of the name “Pegasus” would call 
to mind Mobil’s well-known mark of a flying horse.87  While courts are reluctant to extend such 
“call-to-mind” protection, it is appropriate when there is such overriding similarity between so 
many of the Polaroid factors.
88
 
 Post-sale confusion normally occurs after the point of sale where the buyer is not the one 
confused but others may be.
89
  The danger is that even if the buyer knows the product is a knock-
off, others could be confused.
90
  This could occur if the infringing product is gifted to another or 
sold on the secondary market as speaking to the quality of the legitimate product.  Therefore, 
harm befalls the original trademark owner when inferior goods are traded on his reputation 
outside of his control.
91
  For example, a purchaser of imitation jeans that employ iconic, 
                                                 
84
 See Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1342 (2d Cir. 1975); 
see also Elvis Presley Enterprises Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding nightclub could induce 
potential customers to enter by believing the establishment was somehow affiliated with the estate of Elvis Presley, 
despite the fact that once inside, the consumer would realize there is no such affiliation). 
85
 Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d at 1342. 
86
 See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 259 (2d. Cir. 1987). 
87
 Id. 
88
 See id. 
89
 See Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Wateches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464 (2d 
Cir. 1955). 
90
 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 23.7. 
91
 See Rolex Watch, Inc. v. Canner,  645 F. Supp. 484 (S.D. Fla. 1986). 
protectable, stitching could influence others who believe he has bought the original.
92
  
Additionally, back pocket designs on jeans have also been held likely to confuse in the post-sale 
context because of the effect on prospective purchasers “who carry even an imperfect 
recollection of Strauss’s mark and who observe Wrangler’s projecting label after the point of 
sale.”93  Likelihood of confusion as to source is the more common occurrence but the Lanham 
Act expressly accounts for confusion “as to affiliation, connection, or association.”94 
 “Reverse confusion occurs when the junior user’s advertising and promotion so swamps 
the senior user’s reputation in the market that customers are likely to be confused into thinking 
that the senior user’s goods are those of the junior user.”95  Prospective consumers may believe 
that the senior user is infringing the junior user’s mark and, as a result, the senior user’s 
reputation is irreparably harmed.
96
  “The result is that the senior user loses the value of the 
trademark, its product identity, corporate identity, and control over its goodwill and reputation, 
and ability to move into new markets.”97  For the most part, cases of reverse confusion occur 
when a large company infringes the mark of a small trademark owner.
98
  The seminal reverse 
confusion case originated in the Tenth Circuit.
99
  In Big O, a small tire retailer in Colorado began 
selling its own “BIGFOOT” tires in the spring of 1974.100  That summer, Goodyear set in motion 
the decision to sell its own “BIGFOOT” tires and began advertising.101  The court observed it 
was perfectly reasonable for prospective consumers to believe that Big O was selling Goodyear’s 
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tires.
102
  Reverse confusion cases are unique in that a plaintiff senior user is more likely to 
prevail when its trademark is relatively weak.
103
  This is because the weaker the senior user’s 
mark the more likely the junior user’s appropriation of the mark, in conjunction with the junior 
user’s advertising and saturation of the market, will lead consumers to believe the senior user is 
an unauthorized infringer.
104
 
The Second Circuit identified two explicit examples of instances when infringement 
actions involving non-trademark use that were allowed to proceed under a likelihood of 
confusion analysis.  One such instance involved whether a slogan playing off a trademarked song 
was fair use.
105
  The court in that case found fair use even though the slogan was not being used 
as a mark.
106
 The owners of the trademark in the well-known song “Sing, Sing, Sing” brought an 
infringement action against a manufacturer and seller of golf clubs for using similar stock music 
and the phrase “Swing, Swing, Swing” in television advertisements.107  The Second Circuit 
emphasized the proper inquiry for trademark infringement is there is a likelihood of confusion 
when “consumers believe that the trademark owner sponsors or endorses the use of the 
challenged mark.”108  Although the Second Circuit ultimately decided the case was within 
copyright law and not within the realm of trademark law, the court clearly stated that likelihood 
of consumer confusion was the key analysis and not whether the alleged infringing use was use 
of a trademark.
109
  
An in-depth look at the facts and reasoning of the seminal cases is helpful to understand 
the various trademark issues.   
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Part III: The Circuit Split 
The Sixth Circuit and Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc. 
 Hensley Manufacturing and ProPride are both Michigan corporations that compete 
against each other in the trailer-towing industry.
110
  Hensley Manufacturing bought the business 
of Jim Hensley in 1994.
111
  The company then registered trademarks for the name “Hensley” and 
“Hensley Arrow”.112  “Hensley Manufacturing alleges that these trademarks have become widely 
known and respected in the marketplace for trailers and recreational vehicles.”113  In 2007, 
Hensley Manfucaturing’s sales and marketing director, Sean Woodruff, left the company and 
formed ProPride.
114
  Jim Hensley also left Hensley Manufacturing and licensed his new trailer 
hitch design to ProPride.
115
  ProPride advertised the new trailer hitch as designed by Jim 
Hensley.
116
  ProPride’s advertisements expressly disclaimed Jim Hensley’s affiliation with 
Hensley Manufacturing.
117
  Hensley Manufacturing sued for trademark infringement and 
claimed that ProPride’s used its trademark and caused substantial confusion in the market.118 
 In determining the trademark infringement claim, the Sixth Circuit found the only issue 
was whether there was any likelihood of confusion.
119
  While the court acknowledged that it 
would typically apply the eight-factor test in a likelihood of confusion matter, it added an 
additional, threshold requirement of “whether the defendants are using the challenged mark in a 
way that identifies the source of the goods.”120  The court further held that if the mark is not 
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being used as a source-identifier then it is a non-trademark use and “trademark infringement 
laws, along with the eight-factor analysis, do not apply.”121   
 The Sixth Circuit founded its reasoning on a previous case, Interactive Prods. Corp. v. 
a2z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc.
122
  Interactive Products and a2z both sold portable laptop 
stands.
123
  Problems arose when one of Interactive Products’ partners left and formed his own 
company.
124
  Around the same time, Interactive Products ended its relationship with a2z, with 
whom it had previously sold its product.
125
  Then, a2z sold the portable laptop stand through its 
website.
126
  The departing Interactive Products partner then struck up a business relationship with 
a2z to sell his own design of laptop stand.
127
  The problem was that a2z never changed the 
website.  This resulted in Interactive Products’ trademark, “LAPTRAVELER”, to appear in the 
post-domain path of a2z’s website in conjunction with the sale of a now competing product The 
Mobile Desk.
128
  
The court recognized that it would traditionally apply the eight-factor likelihood of 
confusion test but only if relevant consumers would believe the products are affiliated.
129
  The 
proper inquiry, for the Sixth Circuit, was “whether defendants are using the challenged mark in a 
way that identifies the source of their goods.”130  The court found that if defendants were using 
the mark “in a non-trademark way – that is, in a way that does not identify the source of a 
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product – then trademark infringement and false designation of origin laws do not apply.”131  
Particular to this case, the court found distinctions to domain names and post-domain path 
controlling.
132
  “Words in many domain names can and do communicate source.”133  While this 
is readily apparent it is not always the case, “[w]hen a domain name is used only to indicate an 
address on the Internet and not to identify the source of specific goods and services, the name is 
not functioning as a trademark.”134  “The post-domain path of a URL, however, does not 
typically signify source.  The post-domain path merely shows how the website’s date is 
organized within the host computer’s files.”135  The court concluded that since “there is not any 
evidence that the post-domain path of a2z’s portable-computer-stand web page signifies source, 
it was unnecessary . . . to examine the eight-factors traditionally used to determine likelihood of 
confusion between two source-signifying marks.”136 In summation, the Sixth Circuit expressly 
held that there is no likelihood of confusion when a trademark is used in a way that does not 
signify source. 
The Second Circuit and Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey 
 Simone “Kelly-Brown owns a motivational services business organization around the 
concept ‘Own Your Power.’”137  She “hosts a radio show, holds conferences and retreats, and 
writes a blog promoting” this concept.138  She owns a federally registered service mark in “Own 
Your Power.”139  As the court properly pointed out, “Oprah almost needs no introduction.”140  
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She has been a staple on television and has subsequently built a “vast media empire, which 
consists of, inter alia, a magazine, and a website.”141  Contemporaneously to Kelly-Brown 
registering her mark, Oprah and her affiliates “arranged for the transfer of a trademark in ‘OWN 
ONYX WOMAN NETWORK’ . . . to avoid an infringement action from that mark’s original 
owner.”142  The court noted that Oprah “would likely have been aware of Kelly-Brown’s pending 
registration . . . since the same search defendants would have run to locate and negotiate the 
transfer of the mark in ‘OWN ONYX WOMAN NETWORK’ would have also revealed Kelly-
Brown’s mark.”143  Kelly-Brown then brought a trademark infringement action against Oprah 
and her affiliates originating in September 2010.
144
 
 On September 13, 2010 the October issue of Oprah’s magazine, “O”, hit shelves with a 
cover that “prominently featured the words ‘Own Your Power.’”145  Three days later, the 
magazine held an “Own Your Power” event with other businesses.146  The event featured “a 
seminar and workshop offering motivational advice regarding self-awareness, self-realization, 
and entrepreneurship, under the aegis of the them ‘Own Your Power.’”147  Several celebrities in 
attendance posed for pictures against a backdrop that also prominently featured the phrase “Own 
Your Power.
148
  Oprah’s website uploaded videos of the event on over seventy-five webpages 
that featured an “Own Your Power” banner in the header “that resembled the layout of the 
October issue of the [m]agazine.”149  Oprah’s magazine’s Facebook page displayed photographs 
from the event and Oprah showed the cover of the October issue on her nationally televised 
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show.
150
  As a result, Kelly-Brown and her business “received numerous inquiries from people 
who appears to have confused Kelly-Brown’s services with Oprah’s [e]vent, [w]ebsite, and 
[m]agazine.”151  This competition harmed Kelly-Brown’s brand.152   
 Oprah contended that under the Sixth Circuit Standard and previous Second Circuit law, 
“use as a trademark, is a threshold requirement for adequately alleging a claim of 
infringement.”153  While the Sixth Circuit viewed the use of a mark under a likelihood of 
confusion lens, the Second Circuit examined the criteria for use of a mark in relation to a fair use 
defense and disagreed with the Sixth Circuit’s use of a mark in its likelihood of confusion 
analysis.
154
   
 Oprah claimed that this case was similar to Packman v. Chicago Tribune Co.
155
 in that 
her use of the phrase “Own Your Power” as a headline but not as a trademark.156  In Packman, 
the Chicago Tribune sold t-shirts with a reprinted headline from its issue celebrating the Chicago 
Bulls sixth NBA championship.
157
  Plaintiff brought in action claiming that the newspaper had 
violated her rights in federal and state trademarks because the headline from that day read “the 
joy of six.”158  The Seventh Circuit held that the use of the phrase “the joy of six” was a headline 
and that the distinctiveness of the Tribune’s masthead dispelled any possible consumer confusion 
because consumers would clearly identify the t-shirts and other memorabilia sold with the 
newspaper.
159
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The Second Circuit in Kelly-Brown rejected this argument.  The court found, that when 
determining whether an alleged infringer used a competitor’s mark, the correct inquiry is 
“whether the defendant is using the term as a symbol to attract public attention.”160  The court 
further noted that in making this determination, “we must conduct a close examination of the 
content and context of the use.” 161  The court found that Oprah’s “wide-ranging and varied” use 
met this standard because repetition “forges an association in the minds of consumers between a 
marketing device and a product.
162
  The court noted that it was apparent that Oprah was 
attempting to associate herself with the phrase “Own Your Power.”163    
The court also took issue with the Sixth Circuit’s attempt to change the well-established 
likelihood of confusion inquiry.
164
  The court found the Sixth Circuit’s standard inconsistent with 
a clearly delineated standard that required an intensive factual inquiry, especially since the Sixth 
Circuit “elevate[d] one particular consideration, which is not even one of the eight Polaroid 
factors, above all the other factors.”165  The Second Circuit also observed that it had previously 
allowed infringement claims to proceed when there was no use of a mark.
166
  The court further 
expressed concern that the Sixth Circuit’s standard would stop these cases at the door without 
looking into the determinative question of “whether consumers were actually confused by the 
allegedly infringing product.”167  In sum, the Second Circuit held that the likelihood of consumer 
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confusion is paramount in determining whether use of a trademark rises to the level of 
infringement. 
Part IV.  Analysis  
Use as a Trademark and Public Policy 
The ultimate question then is whether use as a trademark is a threshold requirement for 
an infringement action.  The answer, as the Second Circuit correctly pointed out, should be 
unequivocally no.
168
   This is not to say the Sixth Circuit reached the wrong result in Hensley 
Mfg. but the process and reasoning used to reach its conclusion was faulty.  In fact, it appears the 
Sixth Circuit unnecessarily established a presumptive fair use standard by requiring a threshold 
showing that the alleged infringer is using the designation as a mark without any consideration of 
the Polaroid factors or the existence of the keystone of infringement, likelihood of confusion.
169
    
The Sixth Circuit expanded the nominative fair use defense further than was 
contemplated.  The Ninth Circuit in recognition that sometimes, trademarks designate a product 
where “there is no descriptive substitute” promulgated nominative fair use.170  This occurs when 
there is “a problem closely related to genericity and descriptiveness . . . when many goods and 
services are effectively identifiable only by their trademarks.”171  In New Kids on the Block, the 
court found particularly persuasive the fact that it would be unreasonable to refer to the music 
group in any other way.
172
  Furthermore, nominative fair use only occurs when the alleged 
infringer is using plaintiff’s mark to refer to the plaintiff.173  That is, nominative fair use of a 
trademark is not infringing use because the alleged infringer is not trying to take advantage of 
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plaintiff’s reputation and goodwill by using plaintiff’s mark as a designation of the infringer’s 
goods.
174
  Courts extended nominative fair use to include post-domain paths on the internet.
175
  
The courts noted that the internet is a unique medium and the existence of a trademark in a post-
domain path probably does not signify source.
176
 This is because consumers are unlikely to type 
in the full, complicated, web address that includes the trademark in question of a competitor to 
try and find plaintiff’s product.177  In Hensley though, the defendant was using the trademark as a 
way to identify the source of the goods.
178
  After all, Jim Hensley moved his business to ProPride 
and attempted to capitalize on his personal reputation instead of the reputation of his previous 
business.
179
  This fulfills the policy of allowing an individual to take advantage of his personal 
reputation not the policy advocated by nominative fair use.
180
   
This was not the case in Kelly-Brown.  There, Oprah and her cohorts were attempting to 
forge a relationship between Kelly-Brown’s mark and Oprah.181  The Second Circuit noted that 
Oprah did not use the mark once but had used repetition to try to nurture the association she was 
attempting to build between the mark and her brand.
182
  Oprah was not using the mark “Own 
Your Power” to refer to Kelly-Brown.183  Oprah was, albeit possibly unintentionally, trying to 
convert Kelly-Brown’s mark for her own use and benefit.184  Nevertheless, such use would not 
fall under the Sixth Circuits requirement of “use as a trademark” before going on to a likelihood 
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of confusion analysis.  Thus, Kelly-Brown would be without recourse and rendered helpless to 
defend her mark.  This clearly frustrates the aims of trademark law.
185
 
Additionally, this argument should not even be raised.  The fair use and nominative fair 
use defense are defenses.  The Sixth Circuit, by requiring use as a trademark as a threshold 
requirement, is virtually requiring a plaintiff to disprove an element of a defense before it is even 
raised.  It is the burden of the defendant to prove that he is using the mark in a non-infringing 
way that does not signify himself as the source of the goods.  Trademark law serves the dual 
purpose of protecting both the consumer from confusing marks in the market place and to protect 
an owner’s investment of time, resources, and capital of an owner into building a mark that 
signifies the owner’s right to control the quality of his goods.186   
The Second Circuit properly recognized the futility of this standard.  The ultimate 
question that needs to be asked in an infringement action is whether it is likely that consumers 
are going to be confused.
187
  The Sixth Circuit inexplicably put itself in the shoes of the 
consumer when it announced that as long as an alleged infringer uses the trademark in some way 
that does not signify source, it is impossible for any significant portion of the relevant consumer 
population to be confused.
188
 
There are real dangers in adopting the Sixth Circuit’s standard.  Assuming that the Sixth 
Circuit is correct in holding use of a mark as a trademark is a threshold requirement how would 
the Second Circuit’s interpretation of Kelly-Brown change?  After all, Oprah was not using the 
phrase “Own Your Power” at the magazine event in conjunction with any goods or services.189  
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On the actual issue of the magazine the phrase was being used just as that, as a phrase.
190
  It was 
not being used to identify any of Oprah’s goods or services or to refer to any of Plaintiff’s goods 
or services.
191
  The interesting fact though was the pervasiveness and extensiveness with which 
Oprah and her affiliates attempted to create an association between the phrase “Own Your 
Power” and Oprah, an affiliation that led to direct consumer confusion.192  Under the Sixth 
Circuit’s analysis, such actual consumer confusion is immaterial because as long as the mark was 
not being used as a trademark then there can be no likelihood of confusion under trademark 
law.
193
  This backwards thinking bears dire consequences for trademark owners because it has 
the danger of taking control away from owners protecting their reputation and goodwill.
194
 
Likelihood of Confusion  
The Second Circuit remanded the case back to the district court to determine whether 
likelihood of confusion existed but it may be helpful to do a quick breakdown of whether or not a 
court could find likelihood of confusion in this instance.  Recall that the eight factors for 
likelihood of confusion are: (1) the strength of the mark; (2) the degree of similarity between the 
marks; (3) the proximity of the products; (4) the likelihood the senior user will bridge the gap; 
(5) actual consumer confusion; (6) the junior user’s intent; (7) the quality of the junior user’s 
product; and (8) the sophistication of the buyers.
195
  A brief look shows that some of these 
factors could very well exist in Kelly-Brown.   
Similarity Between the Marks, Proximity of the Products, and Bridging the Gap 
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“Similarity of the marks is judged by their sound, appearance and meaning.”196  When 
goods or services which the alleged infringing mark is attached to compete with the trademark 
owners goods or services for sales then infringement is likely to be found.
197
  The marks are 
extremely similar in that they contain the exact same words.
198
  The services offered by Kelly-
Brown and Oprah are also almost identical.  Anyone who has ever seen Oprah’s show or knows 
of her reputation would be hard put to claim Oprah is not inspirational or motivational.  These 
are the exact services that Kelly-Brown provides.
199
  Since the proximity of the services offered 
are so close, it is unnecessary to contemplate whether Kelly-Brown will bridge the gap because 
there is no gap.
200
   
Actual Consumer Confusion 
Actual consumer confusion, though not required to prove a likelihood of confusion, 
“provides strong support for a finding of a likelihood of confusion.”201  Kelly-Brown testified 
that she and her offices received numerous phone calls inquiring about the mark used in 
conjunction with Oprah.
202
  Therefore, it is obvious that Oprah’s use of such a similar mark 
could have caused actual confusion. 
Intent 
“Where an infringer adopts a particular name with knowledge of plaintiff’s mark, courts 
presume there was an intent to copy the mark.”203  Intent is not required to actually prove 
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likelihood of confusion.
204
  There is also evidence that Oprah’s representatives appropriated the 
mark in bad faith.
205
  The Second Circuit noted that Oprah’s representatives would have almost 
definitely come across Kelly-Brown’s pending registration when they were in the process of 
acquiring the rights to “OWN ONYX WOMAN NETWORK.”206  Based on this it is clear that a 
court or fact-finder could determine that there was intent to copy Kelly-Brown’s mark. 
Types of Confusion Present 
Initial Interest Confusion 
Initial interest confusion occurs when a prospective customer believes there is some 
affiliation between the infringing product and the original trademark owner.
207
  Although in 
Kelly-Brown the marks were similar in sound and appearance this is not required for initial 
interest confusion as long as the prospective consumer initially believes there is some connection 
between the products.
208
  There could easily be initial interest confusion because consumers’ 
who saw the magazine in stores might think, reasonably, that Kelly-Brown has teamed up with 
Oprah.  This could also be the case for anyone who visited Oprah’s website, Facebook page, or 
attended the September event.
209
   
Post-Sale Confusion  
Post-sale confusion does not affect the direct consumer but rather the secondary viewer 
of the mark.
210
  Thus, it is another party who views the junior goods and believes them to be the 
product of the original trademark owner.
211
  This takes the quality of the goods outside the hands 
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of the original trademark owner.
212
  There could be post-sale confusion when those with 
knowledge of Kelly-Brown would see others reading Oprah’s magazine, say in a doctor’s office, 
and assume that Kelly-Brown has now teamed up with Oprah.   
Reverse Confusion 
Reverse confusion occurs when consumers believe that the senior user’s mark infringes 
the junior user’s.213  This can cause the senior user’s reputation to be irreparably harmed.214  
Normally in a reverse confusion case, the weaker the senior user’s mark the more likely he will 
prevail.
215
  Here, there is a very real possibility of reverse confusion.  Oprah is an international 
celebrity with far-reaching influence.
216
  Her ability to saturate the market with references to 
potential marks is almost unparalleled.  In this case, there was a strategic and well-implemented 
marketing plan to create an association in consumer’s minds between “Own Your Power” and 
Oprah.
217
  The average consumer is probably much more likely to encounter Oprah’s products 
and services.  A consumer who then subsequently found Kelly-Brown’s services could very 
reasonably believe that Kelly-Brown was infringing on Oprah’s mark.  This is the very definition 
of reverse confusion.   
As is readily apparent, the danger of likelihood of consumer confusion should not rest on 
a judicially created test to determine if the designation is being used as a trademark but instead 
should focus on the whole purpose of the likelihood of confusion test, whether a significant 
portion of the relevant public could be confused.
218
  This focus fulfills both aims of trademark 
law and further reinforces the correctness of the Second Circuit’s standard that, for trademark 
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213
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215
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 See Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295, 299 (2d. Cir. 2013). 
217
 See id. at 308. 
218
 See Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Co., 412 F.3d 373,  384 (2d Cir. 2005). 
infringement, the use of a mark requirement should focus on whether or not the designation is 
being used to garner attention instead of whether it is being used as a source-identifier. 
Conclusion 
The Sixth Circuit inexplicably narrows trademark protection by raising one of the 
Polaroid factors, use as a trademark, above all others.  The Sixth Circuit fails to account for one 
of the main pillars of trademark law, protecting consumers from confusion.  The Second Circuit 
is correct in keeping the traditional likelihood of confusion analysis in assessing trademark 
infringement.  The Second Circuit strikes the correct balance between upholding the goals of 
trademark law and extinguishing frivolous infringement claims.   
